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The U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea began with the outbreak of the
Korean War. When the Korean War broke out, the U.S. took such measures as embargo
and frozen assets within the U.S. and has been continuously intensifying the blockade
thereafter. The economic sanctions against North Korea started to show changes during
the Bush Administration of the 1980s and began to be partially released in the 1990s.
As the U.S.-North Korea relations, which been seemed to be recovering during the
Clinton Administration, repeat the conflicts and confrontations in the current Bush
Administration, the possibility of the removal of the economic sanctions is even more
decreasing. The U.S. economic blockade also has negative effect on the economic cooper-
ation between South Korea and North Korea.
The speed and the direction of the North Korea's economic reconstruction, the promo-
tion of reform and opening and the removal of the economic blockade will be greatly
influenced by its relation with the U.S. Moreover, the improvement in the relation not
only will affect the problem between the U.S. and North Korea but also will affect the
relation between South and North Koreas. The U.S. economic sanctions are not a rela-
tion problem between the U.S. and North Korea but also a problem to both South and
North Koreas. Moreover, such relation between South and North Koreas will enforced
the relational changes with the surrounding four major countries (Order in the
Northeast area of Asia) around North Korea.
Key Words: Economic Sanctions, Geneva Agreement Framework, Wassenar
Arrangement, South-North Economic Cooperation, Economic Special Zone
UNSETTLED COLD WAR: CONTINUOUS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
U.S. Economic sanctions against North Korea are an outcome of the Cold
War. However, despite the global atmosphere of post-cold war and coopera-
tion, the Cold War order still remains in the Korean Peninsula and the U.S.
economic sanctions also haven’t been removed. Althongh parts of the eco-
nomic sanctions were removed during the Clinton Administration but the
Geneva Framework hasn’t been executed while the U.S. economic sanctions
continue on as usual.1 North Korea also blames its economic crisis on the
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1 According to the Geneva Framework, the U.S. has to remove its economic sanctions
against North Korea and take measures to normalize diplomatic relations. The Article 2 of the 
U.S. economic sanctions and strongly holds the attitude of ‘confrontation
against the imperialism’. Moreover, to overcome the economic sanctions,
North Korea even more strengthens the mobilization of its citizens and
intensely asserts the justness of the ‘self-reliance’ economy as a measure-
ment to emasculate the economic sanctions. In other words, North Korea
insists the mass mobilization of its people and the superiority of its self-
reliance with the following statements. “The reality in which the economic
life of our people has faced with regular difficulties due to the political-mili-
tary aggressions and the maneuvering of the economic sanctions by the
imperialist desperately calls for the epochal change in the people’s lives and
the persistence of our socialism by fully mobilizing and utilizing the source
of consumer lives of the workers hidden in North Korea” (Kim, 1997: 31).
Also, ‘our people’s ‘self-reliance’ economy has faced with difficult times due
to the break down in the socialist markets during the recent years as well as
the intensification of the economic sanctions maneuver by the allied power
of the imperialism. However, it has been displaying strong power as an
economy that survives on its own in any kind of circumstances (Lee, 1997:
5). Moreover, ‘the strengthening of the economic power of the nation is a
decisive element in crushing down the economic sanctions maneuver of the
reactionary imperialists’ (Jang, 1999: 6).
Although such assertions of North Korea have started from the intention of
wanting to blame its own economic crisis on outsiders, but it is also true
that the U.S. economic sanctions is an important factor in the North Korea’s
economic difficulties. Moreover, the U.S. economic sanctions are the deci-
sive obstacle for the reform and the open-door policy, attempted by North
Korea. According to Marcus Noland, ‘the successful reform will be an
important factor in the improvement of the North Korea’s diplomatic envi-
ronment. The truth is the majority of the investors on North Korea are from
either South Korea or Japan. The U.S. economic sanctions surely are the
obstacle for the potential investors from the rest of the world. North Korea
would not be able to experience a large scale investment until it improves
the relation with these three countries.’ He points out how negatively the
U.S. economic sanctions are affecting the reform and opening of North
Korea (Noland, 2001: 88).
The economic sanctions against North Korea by the U.S. widely range from
commerce, finance, support from the international organization, trade, and
aid to frozen assets. Especially, the economic blockade followed by the des-
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Geneva Framework clearly states, ‘Both sides pursue complete normalization of political and
economical relations.’
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TABLE 1. THE U.S. MEASURES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA
Date Related Base Details










Trading With The Enemy Act
(Foreign Assets Control Regulation)
Free Trade Agreement Extension Act







International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations (Revision)
— Frozen assets of North Korea within the
U.S.
— Announced the ‘Foreign Assets Control
Regulation’, which actually prohibits all
of trade and financial transaction with
North Korea 
— Prohibited the bestowal of the Most
Favored Nation (MFN) to North Korea
— Prohibited import and export of the
emanation goods and services with
North Korea
— Prohibited providing assistance to
North Korea
— Prohibited giving of Generalized System
of Preference (GSP) to North Korea
— Enforced the general embargo by includ-
ing North Korea in group Z, which is for
the nations to be restrained (enforced the
general embargo of the U.S. import/
export banking against North Korea)
— Prohibited the U.S. import/export bank-
ing from giving credit to North Korea
— Named North Korea as a terrorism sup-
porting country and prohibited trade,
GSP, sales of the controlled items of
munitions, and receiving foreign assis-
tance or credit from the import/export
banking
— Ordered to vote against North Korea in
regards to the decision of the interna-
tional financial organization providing
assistance
— Prohibited the sales or the import/export
of the emanation goods and services with
North Korea, which has been designated
as a global terrorism supporting country
ignation of North Korea as a terrorism supporting country, impose direct
control on desperately needed the capital and the technology, by prohibiting
export of the strategic materials, the loan and the aid through the interna-
tional organizations. Consequently, it has hindered the reform that North
Korea is currently promoting.
THE HISTORY AND REALITY OF THE U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
AGAINST NORTH KOREA 
The U.S. economic sanctions of North Korea began with the outbreak of the
Korean War. When the Korean War broke out, the U.S. took such measures
as embargo and freezing assets within the U.S. and has been continuously
intensifying the blockade thereafter. The reality is that the economic sanc-
tions against North Korea by the U.S. are considered as one of the strongest
measures. The U.S. economic sanctions of North Korea are as follow.
The U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea initially started with the
prohibition of the import/export and the financial transactions and now it
imposes restrictions on the assistance, general goods and military goods
along with the transactions with a third party nation. Especially, upon the
bombing incident of the Korean Air in 1987, the U.S. blockaded the assis-
tance of the international society by designating North Korea as a terrorism
supporting country.
Nevertheless, the economic sanctions against North Korea started to show
changes during the Bush Administration of the 1980s and began to be par-
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TABLE 1. CONTINUED
Date Related Base Details
Export Administration Act – Prohibited export against North Korea
Mar. 6, 1992
June 23, 1992
* Source: David, Zachary S. et al. (1994).
Controlled Items of Munitions — Prohibited the import/export of the
controlled items of munitions as well as
the U.S. administrative contract for two
years against North Korea, which has
been judged as having a part in the tech-
nology expansion on missiles of Iran
and Syria
— Applied to all of activities of North
Korean government in relation to the
production of missiles, electronics, aero-
space and warplanes
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1) Communication and Information
— Approved the transactions in relation to the telephone
and communication link between the U.S. and North
Korea
— Approved private tours and the usage of credit card
in relation
— Approved the establishment of the branch office of the
press
2) Banking and Financial Transactions
— Approved the use of the U.S. banking system for the
settlement of opening or closing of transactions in the
U.S.
— Removed the blockade against the North Korea’s
frozen assets, which are not the real right of the gov-
ernment of North Korea
3) Transactions on Trade
— Approved the import of the magnesite from North
Korea
4) Others
— Approved the institution of contact offices in
Washington and Pyongyang
— Examination per case regarding the business in accor-
dance with applicable laws and regulations of the
general agreement between the U.S. and North Korea
— Approved the import of the majority products includ-
ing the raw materials of North Korea in the U.S. mar-
ket
— Approved the export of the consumer products and
banking services to North Korea
— Approved the investment by the U.S. companies in
the areas of agriculture, mining, petroleum, lumber,
cement, transportation, road building and tourism in
North Korea
— Approved the money sending to the relatives and
individuals by the civilians residing in the U.S.
— Approved the transportation of general goods (non-
sensitive materials) by the American vessels or planes
to North Korea
— Approved the operation of commercial planes
between the U.S. and North Korea
tially released in the 1990s. In particular, some parts of the blockade such as
finance, trade and communication were removed as the conflict over the
nuclear and missile problems neared resolution during the Clinton adminis-
tration. Such removal of the U.S. measures against North Korea is in accor-
dance with the execution schedule of the Geneva Framework. The first stage
of removal measures had been executed in 1994 after the Geneva
Framework and the second stage came along with the announcement of the
missile testing reservation in 1999 followed by the progress of the Berlin
Act. The removal measures of the economic restraint by the U.S. over the
two stages are as followed.
Even before the removal of the sanctions by the U.S. goverment over the
two stages, the U.S. goverment had approved the tourist services of the U.S.
travel agencies in regards to the non-commercial areas of athletics, science
and culture through the revision of the ‘Foreign Assets Control Regulation’
on January 3, 1989. Likely, the U.S. approved the financial transactions in
relation to the import and the export of the published materials through the
same method on February 2 and also approved the ‘export of the humani-
tarian goods such as food, drugs and medical supplies’ by partially revising
the ‘Export Administration Law’ on April 24 of the same year. The back-
ground for such kind of removal measures on the economic restraints in
1989 even at an insignificant level can be found from the series of diplomat-
ic contacts between the U.S. and North Korea through Beijing, China start-
ing December of 1988. With the start of this contact, the U.S. and North
Korea held meaningful high-level talks in 1992 between Arnold Kanter, the
Under Secretary of State of the U.S. and Yong Soon Kim of North
Korea(David, Niksch, Nowels, Pregelj, Shinn & Sutter, 2001: 42-43).
However, the executed measure of the time had been generally limited to
the humanitarian products or assistance and to the non-political areas such
as traveling, athletics and science.
The removal measure of the U.S. on the blockade, according to the Geneva
Framework of 1994, was insufficient. The Geneva Framework included the
comprehensive details in regards to the improvement of the relations
between the U.S. and North Korea, the removal of the economic restraints
and especially the reformative attitude about the diplomatic normalization
and the problems of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, if the Geneva
Framework had been realized, such issues as taking North Korea off the list
of terrorism sponsoring countries a terrorism supporting country, removal
of the economic sanctions, diplomatic normalization of the U.S. and North
Korea, nuclear and missile problem of North Korea ultimately would have
reached resolutions. However, with the dissipation of the Geneva
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Framework and the continuation of the resolute measures and the economic
sanctions of the Bush Administration, the economic blockade of North
Korea has been firmly maintained.
THE THEORY OF THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE EFFECTS
Generally, the economic sanctions are used as a method in between the
diplomatic resolution and the military resolution. According to the report of
the U.S. General Accounting Office, the economic sanctions are effective in
the following situations: First, when an opposing political party or a politi-
cal party wanting diplomatic relations is present within the restrained
nation, second, when the blockade is multiple and also inflicted upon the
countries engaging in relations with the restrained nation, and third, and
when the blockade is imposed on a country with cultural similarities.
Nevertheless, the blockade is ineffective if it’s incomprehensive and the
restraining country has relations with the enemy nations of the restrained
country. Moreover, the report makes a point about the possibility of the
restrained country solidifying the unity within the nation by blaming its
economic crisis on the blockade (GAO, 1992). For instance, Cuba is a repre-
sentative example of a nation that had used the economic sanctions as a
means of uniting its citizens by cultivating the domestic resistant culture
and North Korea is also not an exception. In this point of view, it can be said
that the present economic sanctions against North Korea by the US have a
negative impact on the economic constructions of North Korea so seriously
but at the same time these sanctions also have an unexpected effects of rein-
forcing national unity with intensifying anti-Americanism in North Korea.
Besides, North Korea used the US’ economic sanctions for justifying its
political system blaming the outside for its economic difficulties. The US
sanctioned North Korea to weaken its system but it has been proved that in
reality the results are rather  opposite.
Accordingly, accomplishing the official purpose of the economic blockade
against such countries is difficult and it just imposes the symbolic meaning
of the blockade.2 Nevertheless, even if the economic sanctions don’t accom-
plish its official purpose, the country being restrained has to overcome an
enormous economic loss such as slowdown in the trade, transactions and
U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 223
2 United States General Accounting Office also points out that the accomplishment of the
official purpose among the three purposes of the economic sanctions is difficult and it is just
symbolic and effective in the international structure. Refer to the page 22 of the GAO Report
in regards to the elements for the possible success in the economic sanctions pointed out by
GAO.
growth rate along with inefficiency. Such economic loss continuously brings
negative effect on the long-term economic advancement of the restrained
country. Especially, the economic loss of North Korea, which had been
enduring the economic blockade for over 50 years even after the Cold War
due to the country’s the designation as a terrorist supporting country, can be
tremendous. Moreover, the economic sanctions of present days emphasize
even more absolute and disadvantageous conditions in comparison to the
blockade of the Cold War. In other words, the economic sanctions of the
Western countries had been overcome through the cooperation among the
socialist nations when the socialist camp existed as a market. However, the
economic blockade in the situation where the socialist market had been van-
ished is a serious challenge in a sense of loosing cooperative parties. The
extinction of the socialist market signifies the loss of alternative means in
detouring or breaking the economic blockade. Accordingly, the current eco-
nomic sanctions on North Korea are enforcing North Korea to break off its
relations with the global economics.3
Actually, the genuine intention of the current U.S. economic blockade
against North Korea are the following: to arrest the expansion of the mass
destructive weapon and the ballistic missiles, to improve the human rights,
to put an end to the support on terrorism, to obstruct drug dealings and
armed attacks, to protect the environment and to changed the government.
In such areas, the tactical purpose of the given blockade could be suppres-
sion, oppression, warning and punishment (Haass, 1998: 1). Also, the form
of such blockade appears in varieties from a substantial blockade to a sym-
bolic rhetoric blockade. However, since the purpose of the economic sanc-
tions by the U.S. are strongly politicized, it is clear that the blockade is close-
ly linked to the national interest of the U.S. Especially, in the case of having
a close link with the political, economical and militaristic profit of the U.S.,
the economic blockade will end at a symbolic or political rhetoric level, as
proven through the example of China (Ross, 1998: 17). In other words, as for
China, the economic sanctions are executed just as a symbolic measure in
accordance with the national interests of the U.S. but were never enforced in
reality. Thus, the removal of the economic blockade on North Korea is
directly connected to the problem of relational improvement with the U.S.
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3 After the collapse of socialist block, the US’ economic sanctions against North Korea had
become a more critical obstacle to North Korean economy. North Korea in short of foreign
currency now faces a difficult situation not only because it has to import all the materials by
international market price that were relatively lower through socialist block but also because
it can’t import necessary law materials, technologies and commodities under the US’ econom-
ic sanctions.
and the problem of the designation as a terrorism supporting country also
depends on the resolution of the political and military problems between
the U.S. and North Korea.
As the U.S.-North Korea relations, which seemed to be recovering during
the Clinton Administration, repeat the conflicts and confrontations in the
current Bush Administration, the possibility of the removal of the economic
sanctions is further decreasing. The U.S. economic blockade also has nega-
tive effect on the economic cooperation between South Korea and North
Korea. This clearly shows that the U.S. economic blockade not only puts on
pressures against North Korea but also against the countries and companies
in transaction with North Korea. In the case of Cuba, the blockade symbol-
ized by the Helms-Burton Law has its goal as far as to the blockade against
the nations and companies in transactions with Cuba. The case of North
Korea is different from the Cuban case but is subjected to the restraint in the
case of transactions and investment on the items limited by the U.S. govern-
ment. Specifically, being North Korea has been designated as a terrorism
supporting country, the cooperation between South and North Koreas are
limited as well in accordance with the ‘Wassenar Arrangement’.
The specific difficulties occurring in the process of reform and opening of
North Korea due to the U.S. economic sanctions and the designation as a
terrorist supporting country can be clearly seen in the following areas:
First of all, North Korea can’t receive the necessary aid and loan from the
international financial organizations. Currently, North Korea is unable to
receive aid and loan from the international financial organizations due to
the designation as a terrorism supporting country by the U.S. According to
the ‘Export Administration Act’ of 1988, it is prescribed for the U.S. to vote
against the support of the international financial organizations on the coun-
tries designated as terrorism supporting countries and consequently, the
international financial organizations heavily influenced by the U.S. cannot
support North Korea.
The contact between North Korea and the international financial organiza-
tions regularized during the 1990s. The World Bank sent out Bradley
Babson, senior advisor of the East Asia and Pacific Region, to Pyongyang in
February of 1998. Babson frankly stated the possibility of aid on technology
and training even before the official joining of the organization. Moreover,
International Monetary Fund also sent out a team to Pyongyang after a cou-
ple of contacts and completed a report on the economy of North Korea and
the assistance (Kim, 2001: 94-96). North Korea also seemed to desire support
from such organizations. Nevertheless, receiving aid from such organiza-
tions heavily depends on the release of the designation as a terrorism sup-
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porting country and the improvement of the relation with the U.S. as seen in
the cases of China and Vietnam. As for the cases of China and Vietnam, the
improvement in the relation with the U.S. had been a decisive factor (Kim,
2001: 53-76). Currently, North Korea is showing interest in the Asia
Development Bank, in which South Korea could comparative strongly influ-
ence the decision on the support for North Korea. However, despite its offi-
cial registration for the membership in April of 1997, North Korea’s mem-
bership had been rejected due to the opposition of the U.S. and Japan, who
provides mutual cooperation to the political measures of the U.S. North
Korea again applied for the membership in May of 2000 but was one again
denied due to the opposition of the U.S. and Japan (Kim, 2001: 97). The rea-
son for such denial is the fact that North Korea is still considered as a terror-
ism supporting country. Ultimately, North Korea would continually experi-
ence difficulties in receiving assistance from the outside world for the eco-
nomic reconstruction without the improvement in the relation with the U.S.
and the release from the designation as a terrorism supporting country.
Such difficulties in the flow of the fund show the reality in which there is
high possibility of not being able to achieve actual investment despite the
reform and opening of North Korea.4
Second, North Korea can’t receive any technological donation. Being desig-
nated as a terrorism supporting country means the prohibition of exporting
and receiving of the so-called strategic goods and the latest technologies
(technologies which can be used in the military purpose). Although the
Coordinating Committee for Export Control (COCOM ), which was estab-
lished during the Cold War to prohibit exports of the strategic goods and
technologies, ceased its function,5 however, the regulation structure on the
strategic goods and technologies has continued on due to the ‘Wassenar
Arrangement’, which was formed to replace COCOM. Especially, being des-
ignated as a terrorism supporting country, North Korea is a ‘highly
observed country’ in regards to the strategic goods and technologies and
consequently is restrained under the same structure as the COCOM struc-
ture of the past. Consequently, the increasing impossibility of the importa-
tion of the technologies and parts in relation to semi conductor, electronic
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4 Consequently, North Korea is more interested in the colonial indemnities from Japan than
the assistance from the international organizations. It can be said that the only vast amount of
fund that North Korea is capable of receiving, besides the economical cooperation with South
Korea, is from Japan.
5 COCOM had been officially disorganized on March 31, 1994. The ‘Wassenar Arrangement’
was newly established, in placement of COCOM, through the First General Assembly in July
of 1996.
equipments and computer, which are desperately needed by North Korea,
has burdened the nation with serious obstacles in its desire to reconstruct
the economy centering on the scientific technologies. According to the
recent reporting, North Korea has started to produce computers indepen-
dently through the joint ventures with China. North Korea referred to the
‘Wassenar Arrangement’ and argued, ‘We have reopened the path which
had been blocked by the economic blockade with the cooperation from
other country.’6 Nevertheless, the efforts to circumvent through the joint
venture with other countries has limitations and since the most of the coun-
tries with the high level technologies which North Korea desires are the
members of the ‘Wassenar Arrangement’, thus there is very little possibility
of forming a joint venture with North Korea due to the restraint of the U.S.7
Ultimately, as mentioned earlier, North Korea must be removed from being
designated as a terrorism supporting country in order to import the neces-
sary technologies and this signifies that the improvement in the relation
between the U.S. and North Korea is the decisive factor in the situation.
Third, the ongoing economic cooperation between South and North Koreas
is also faced with limitations. Currently, exchanged goods between South
and North Korea are mainly the consumer goods, while the processing of
brought-in materials take up the majority of trade. Not only the carrying out
of the sensitive goods to North Korea is impossible due to the U.S economic
sanctions but also the South Korean government also suppresses from send-
ing out sensitive goods becanse of the blockade. Such situation brings about
a negative future prospect not only to the trade transactions between the
two countries but also for the construction of Kaesung industrial complex in
the near future. In other words, if the current blockade continues on, the
technologies to be sent to and the goods to be produced at the Kaesung
industrial complex have to be restricted.8 Already there had been some con-
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6 Chosun Shinbo, March 17, 2003. The computer developed by North Korea is a product of a
joint company called, ‘Morning-Panda Computer Joint Company,’ which is a joint venture
between the Panda Electronic Mass Limited Company of china and the North Korean elec-
tronic product development company. The company produces 6 types of computers and the
best one is the Pentium 4.
7 Currently, North Korea is importing advanced technological products such as computers
from China and Singapore who are not included in the ‘Wassenar Arrangement.’
8 Electricity might be included here. The U.S. has put a break on the South Korea’s electrici-
ty supply to North Korea by bringing in the Geneva Framework and the ‘Wassenar
Arrangement.’ On the other side, as a representative case of failed cooperation between South
and North Koreas due to the U.S. in accordance with the ‘Wassenar Arrangement’ is the com-
munication business advancement to North Korea through the CDMA technology. The tech-
nological advancement of CDMA (mobile communication business in North Korea), which 
the Korea Telecom and the SK Telecom have promoted with passion, required an approval 
flicts among South Korean government and civil organizations in relation to
carrying out strategic materials into Kaesung industrial complex. Even the
South Korean unification minister asked a favor of the US directly to explain
the official position of the South Korean government on the US’ restriction
of strategic materials. At the present there are the 15 model factories operat-
ing or preparing to operate. The amicable settlement of disputes on the
exportation of the strategic materials should be encourged before Kaesung
industrial complex could operate successfully.9 Moreover, as the marking of
the origin of the product has become mandatory, the export of the products
produced at the Kaesung industrial complex to the U.S. is restricted. That is,
the products made in North Korea cannot receive tax benefits under the cur-
rent economic sanctions. In relation to this matter the South Korean reunifi-
cation ministry already decided to mark the products produced in Kaesung
as made in DPRK. The ministry also made its position clear that South
Korea would negotiate with others for the products produced in Kaesung to
be considered as made in ROK as South Korea enters into FTA. However
once these products are marked as made in DPRK, many obstacles are
expected in exporting them to the US or other Western Europesn countries.
As a result, even through the U.S. economic blockade has ended with a
symbolic effect in most parts and is not yielding the expected outcomes. The
limitation North Korea currently faces is enormous and furthermore, greatly
affects the economic cooperation between South and North Koreas. This
shows that the U.S. is not gaining the desired result from the political per-
spective but surely is putting an enormous pressure on North Korea eco-
nomically. Of course these economic sanctions against North Korea are not
only taken by the US. In other words, the present economic sanctions
against North Korea are multilateral. South Korea and Japan are included.
And the multilateral economic blockade hinders the present economic coop-
eration between South and North Koreas. But in the side of South Korea, it
also suffers for it can’t make its decision independently because of the US
regulations — for example the restriction on import and export of strategic
materials — in the on-going economic cooperation between two Koreas
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from the U.S. Department of Commerce since its original technology is with the Qualcomm of
the U.S. However, this business failed due to the rejection from the U.S. despite the participa-
tion of the CEO of Qualcomm.
9 Meanwhile in the case of connecting phone line to Kaesung industrial complex, a South
Korean company, KT submitted a transmission equipments application to the US ministry of
commerce. In relation to this, Markus Noland, a senior fellow at IIE in the US insisted only
wiretapping possible land lines by South Korea would be allowed. His comment shows how
much influences the US makes to import or export necessary equipments in Kaesung industri-
al complex.
especially in the economic cooperation in Kaesung industrial complex. It
indicates the US is at the center of the economic blockade though it is multi-
lateral.
PROFIT OF NORTH KOREA WITH THE REMOVAL OF THE ECONOMIC
BLOCKADE
As stated above, due to U.S. economic sanctions and the designation as a
terrorism supporting country, North Korea has encountered limitation in
carrying out transactions with other capitalist countries in terms of trade,
finance, and technology. These limitations are a serious obstacle in its eco-
nomic reconstruction. Then, what are the gains that North Korea would
receive from the removal of the economic blockade and the release from
being a terrorism supporting country? Plainly speaking, it is unlikely to
anticipate practical effect in a short period of time but it could be said that
the symbolic gain and the long-term effect would be great. First of all, North
Korea would experience difficulties in the production of a product with
competitive power in the international market just with the technology and
the quality level of products of North Korea at the time. This explains that
short-term anticipation is hard to count on. Some products can be equipped
with the competitive power but there is almost zero possibility of the prod-
ucts made in North Korea being introduced in the U.S. market besides the
third world countries. Temporarily, such products can achieve some effect in
the primary trade of produced goods but it should be said that there is no
competitive power of such products beyond that level. Secondly, North
Korea must receive large-scale investment from South Korea and Japan in
addition to the from the international financial organizations in order to
gain loan and assistance for its economic reconstruction. Nevertheless, the
large-scale investment of South Korea and Japan is too much for a civilian
private company to be burdened with and consequently, it requires the eco-
nomic cooperation from the government. Recollecting the example of
Japan’s support on China in the past where the aid of the Japanese govern-
ment followed by the advancement of the Japanese companies had been
possible (Seo, 2002), general reformative measures of the South and North
Korea relation and North Korea and Japan relation must precede. On the
other side, the aid from the international financial organization such as the
IMF and the World Bank requires a precondition of overall reform in the
internal economic structure such as the prospect on the liberalistic economic
structure as well as the clarity on the business administration.10
Accordingly, if the reform and the open policies of North Korea are not met
U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 229
with the standard requested by the international financial organizations,
receiving the aid will be once again difficult. Ultimately, it shows that the
lifting of the U.S. economic sanctions and the removal from the list of terror-
ism supporting country are not only the satisfactory conditions for in the
importation of the fund and technology to North Korea. Simply, such mea-
sures are the necessary conditions in making a better environment for North
Korea to advance to the international society. However, despite the reality of
the situation, the symbolic effect of the removal of the economic sanctions
and the release from being a terrorism supporting country would be very
enormous. This signifies that North Korea’s entering into the international
society has become official and that the U.S. has acknowledged North Korea
as an economic partner or a member of the global society (Cho & Kim, 1999:
9). Moreover, such measurement would have symbolic effect on countries
like Japan and Europe. Also, it would ultimately lessen the political pres-
sure of the civilian companies desiring to invest in North Korea and would
be able to create an advantageous environment, which could bring about
activeness in investment in accordance with the improvement level of the
relations between North Korea and other countries.
On the other side, the removal of the economic blockade would encourage
and speed up the economic cooperation of South and North Koreas, which
have been progressing very slowly. As seen in the previons section, the cur-
rent blockade is causing numerous obstacles in the economic cooperation
between South and North Korea and has high potential to do the same in
the future. However, the removal of the blockade symbolizes the elimina-
tion of the exterior obstacles and consequently, the economic cooperation in
accordance with the direct requests of South and North Koreas can be real-
ized.
The removal of the U.S. economic blockade and the measurements on the
release of North Korea from being a terrorism supporting country symboli-
cally display the improvement in the relations between the U.S. and North
Korea. Accordingly, it would not only bring about a fixation of peace in the
Korean Peninsula but also an improvement in the relations between South
and North Koreas, and between North Korea and Japan. This signifies the
formation of international environment which allows the successful reform
and opening promoted by North Korea. Truthfully, North Korea’s reform
and opening had been influenced by the exterior conditions and consider-
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10 The report of the U.S. Diplomatic Relations Committee also points out that the fund sup-
port from the international financial organizations must require preconditions of clarity and
economic reform (Council on Foreign Relations. 1998. Managing Change on the Korean
Peninsular, July 8, 1998. Recited From Cho, Dong Ho & Kim, 1999).
ing the high possibility of the same hereafter, such measurements would in
return form a decisive international condition, which would lead to an exe-
cution of a successful reform policy. Accordingly, the removal of the U.S.
economic sanctions and the release as a terrorism supporting country has
greater importance not simply in the economical aspects but rather in the
perspectives of politics and international politics. 
NORTH KOREA’S RESPONSE: REFORMATION OF THE INTERNAL
STRUCTURE AND STRENGTHENING OF SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA
ECONOMIC COOPERATION
The continuation of conflicts between the U.S. and North Korea predicts
that the removal of the economic sanctions and the release as a terrorism
supporting country would be difficult for now. However, just ‘muddling
through’ while leaving the reform and opening of North Korea on the mea-
sure of the U.S. is also impossible.11 What is the North Korea’s response?
Also, how would North Korea accomplish its active reform and opening
when there is no removal of the blockade?
North Korea is trying to minimize the U.S. economic blockade by strength-
ening its cooperation with Europe, China and Russia. As seen in the case of
Cuba, the U.S. economic blockade cannot be absolutely perfect. Cuba has
suffered from the continuous economic blockade by the U.S. and any coun-
tries, companies or individuals who don’t conform to the U.S. blockade are
also affected as well (Helms-Burton Law). Nevertheless, Cuba has mini-
mized the U.S. economic blockade through preparation of active domestic
environment and systematical improvement along with the management of
more advantageous conditions for the outside investors. And recently, Cuba
has been achieving somewhat successful outcome in the reform and open-
ing (Haass, 1998; Kim, 2002). It is true that the conditions of North Korea are
different from Cuba in the areas of politics, economics, military and interna-
tional relations, but it is a definite truth that an improvement in the domes-
tic environment is an important element as much as the improvement in the
external environment for the successful execution of the reform and open-
ing. The North Korea’s open policy experience of Najin-Sunbong in 1991
showed that the improvement of the domestic environment such as the
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11 Marcus Noland argues that the method chosen by North Korea is ‘muddling through’ the
situation. However, such method has originated from the static North Korean perspective that
didn’t consider the internal movement, surrounding relations of South and North Koreas. It is
the result of not actively comprehending the North Korea’s movements from the middle of
1990s (Noland, 2002).
infrastructure and improvement in laws and regulations had a decisive
influence, just as much as the improvement of the external environment.
Consequently, two conditions are required in order to overcome the external
disadvantages of the U.S. economic blockade. The first one is to improve the
domestic environment and to prepare systematical provision in which the
investors from outside would gain profit by investing fund and technology.
The recent opening of Shinuiju and Kaesung of North Korea as ‘Special
Economic Zones’ is evaluated as a step closer to such condition. The second
condition is to strengthen the cooperative relations with Europe, Russia and
China even before the improvement in the relations with the U.S. As men-
tioned earlier, North Korea has already taken measures in strengthening the
economic cooperation through the strengthening of the relations with
Europe and the improvement of the active relations with China and Russia
after the high level talks with these countries. As a result, such measures
have been providing external environment at the minimum level to the
recent economic reform and opening of North Korea. However, strengthen-
ing the improvement of the relation with South Korea and actualizing the
economic cooperation are the most important measures to be taken. South
Korea is a nation that could actually invest in a large scale in North Korea.
North Korea would be just able to receive reparations from Japan. The eco-
nomic cooperation with South Korea under such condition would not only
be important from the economic side but also as an important element in the
fixation of peaceful structure in the Korean Peninsula and in the increase of
encouraging other countries’ investment in North Korea. Furthermore, the
cooperation between South and North Koreas would actually weaken the
U.S. economic blockade.
The economic cooperation of South and North Koreas has expanded since
1989 and the trade total in year 2002 records over 600 million U.S. dollars.
Such number takes up 28% of North Korea’s total trade of about 2.2 billion
U.S. dollars in 2002. In other words, South Korea, leaving Japan out, has
become the second greatest trading partner of North Korea followed by
China.12
Moreover, the successful progress on the currently executed Kaesung
Industrial Complex and the tourist business of the Kumgang Mountains will
improve the economic cooperation of South and North Koreas.13 On top of
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12 According to the economical statistics of year 2003, the trading scale between North
Korea and Japan was about 250 million U.S. dollars, the lowest since the 1990s. On the other
side, the trade with China is reaching over billion U.S. dollars.
13 Through the 13th General Level Conference, South and North Koreas have agreed upon
the moving in of the South Korean companies in regards to the Kaesung Industrial Complex 
this, the connection of main transportation lines (Kyunguison: the railroad
from Seoul to Shinuiju & Donghaeson: the east-coast railroad) signifies that
the economical cooperation of South and North Koreas has been found on a
systematical ground. As a matter of course, there still remain many obsta-
cles and difficulties to overcome. Especially, the construction of an industrial
complex would be difficult without the assistance given the insufficiency of
the North Korea’s infrastructure, the lack of electricity and large scale
investment the government. Thus, the construction of a close cooperative
system between the governments of these two countries is very important.
Nevertheless, there is no certainty that such kind of business would
progress as planned. The U.S. economic sanctions are supported by the
political and military power and as it is vividly seen in the Bush
Administration, Bush Administration’s oppressive political measures
against South Korea is causing setbacks in the cooperative business between
South and North Koreas. Especially, there still remain the limit on the
embargo materials due to the designation as a terrorism supporting country
and the limitation on trade because of the ‘Wassenar Arrangement.’ The
South Korean government has executed the ‘catch-all’ system sinco January
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TABLE 3. CURRENT STATUS OF NORTH KOREA’S OVERSEAS TRADE (UNIT: 100 MILLION
U.S. DOLLARS)
Year Export Import Total
1991 9.4 16.4 25.8
1992 9.3 16.2 25.6
1993 9.9 16.5 26.5
1994 8.6 12.4 21.0
1995 7.4 13.1 20.5
1996 7.3 12.5 19.8
1997 9.1 12.7 21.8
1998 5.6 8.8 14.4
1999 5.1 9.6 14.8
2000 5.6 14.1 19.7
2001 6.5 16.2 22.7
2002 7.3 15.3 22.6
2003 7.8 16.2 23.9
* The Bank of Korea (http://www.bok.or.kr/index.jsp).
by constructing a model complex during the first half of this year. Nevertheless, since all of
the agreements of these countries have always experienced difficulties in their execution due
to the unpredictable variables or obstacles, this will also go through various ups and downs
along its pathway to a completion (Yonhapnews, February 6, 2004).
1, 2003 in regards to the import and export of the strategic materials against
the non-members of the ‘Wassenar Arrangement’ (Digital Times, 2002). With
the execution of this system, the regulations on the import and the export of
the strategic materials have been even more restricted and this symbolizes
the gradual difficulties in the importing of the strategic materials or the
strategic technologies unless North Korea is released from being a terrorist
supporting country.
Ultimately, minimizing the blockade through the cooperation with Europe,
China and Russia as well as the weakening the blockade through the
strengthening of the cooperative spirit between South and North Koreas are
just partial solutions. Since the last summit talk, North Korea not only
strengthened its relation with the European Union but also has established a
partial ‘New Northern Triangular Alliance’ with China and Russia.
Especially, North Korea even more strengthened its cooperative formation
in economics with Russia in regards to the scientific technology and railroad
agreements. Russia is also showing a positive attitude on this. Nevertheless,
due to the continuation and the worsening of the conflicted relations of the
U.S. and North Korea, such management is not displaying appropriate
results. Ultimately, the improvement of the relation between the U.S. and
North Korea will still play as the determining factor.
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TABLE 4. CURRENT STATUS OF TRADE BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREAS         (UNIT: 1,000 DOLLARS)
Years In Out Total
1989 18,655 69 18,724
1990 12,278 1,188 13,466
1991 105,719 5,547 111,266
1992 162,863 10,563 173,426
1993 178,167 8,425 186,592
1994 176,298 18,249 194,547
1995 222,855 64,436 287,291
1996 182,400 69,639 252,039
1997 193,069 115,270 308,339
1998 92,264 129,679 221,943
1999 121,604 211,832 333,437
2000 152,373 272,775 425,148
2001 176,170 226,787 402,957
2002 271,575 370,155 641,730
2003 289,252 434,965 724,217
Source: The Ministry of Unification (2003).
CONCLUSION: THE CO-RELATION THE CHANGES OF NORTH KOREA
AND THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Recently, North Korea has been demonstrating changes with the measures
taken for the economic improvement in comparison to the past (so called,
7.1 policy). As the earnings of the laborers and farmers in North Korea
increased, the consumption also increased and number of people earning
large income has been gradually increasing as well. Numerous people are
gathering in swarms to buy goods at a legalized marketplace and bargain
the prices of the goods. Private stores have been prohibited in the past but
now anyone with a capability can own and manage private stores.14
Moreover, the management of the domestically operated department stores
has been entrusted to private parties or foreigners (Joongang Daily News,
2003). Regarding such changes, North Korea decided that earning received
from one’s labor is appropriate and actively encouraged citizens to produce
profit. Accordingly, the motivation for labor has increased among the labor-
ers and the farmers and started to show a positive response on the economic
improvement measures. However, other regions besides certain regions cen-
tering on the city of Pyongyang still shows the unmatched of the supply
and demand as well as the lack in the necessities. North Korea looks for
external blame for the reasons of the situation. Thus, North Korea talks
about the U.S. being the biggest obstacle in the economic construction, argu-
ing that North Korea would persevere until the end (Chung, 2003).15 It is
unclear whether the argument of North Korea is either an argument from a
mere impulse or an important watershed of the relation with the U.S.
Nevertheless, one thing clear is that the U.S. certainly is an obstacle in the
construction of North Korea’s building of the ‘economical powerful state.’
Also, it clearly shows that North Korea’s building the ‘economical powerful
state’ as well as the reform and opening policy can’t be successfully execut-
ed unless the mountain, called, the U.S. is not overcome. Especially, North
Korea’s New Year’s Editorial (2004) expresses its intention in engaging
active negotiations or brutal battle with the U.S (Nodong Shinmun, 2004).
Such facts show that the current economic sanctions could only be resolved
through the improvement of the U.S. and North Korea relation. At this
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14 In relation to this, it is assumed that in fact not many genuine private stores exist. While
there are increasing vendors mainly in town streets in Pyongyang, most of them are run by
certain units like people’s neighborhood units or cooperate restaurants.
15 Such attitude of North Korea is from the ‘I’ll persevere all the way to the end of imperial-
ism,’ which was said during the political arguments of Nodong Shinmun right after the visit of
an American envoy, Kelly, on October 6, 2001.
point, we now see that the U.S. economic blockade is ultimately not a prob-
lem of ‘economics’ but a problem of ‘politics’.
The speed and the direction of the North Korea’s economic reconstruction,
the promotion of reform and opening and the removal of the economic
blockade will be greatly influenced by its relation with the U.S. Moreover,
the improvement in the relation not only will affect the problem between
the U.S. and North Korea but also will affect the relation between South and
North Koreas. The influence could range from the economic cooperative at
the minimal level and to the great influence on the peace and unification of
the two divided countries by large. We can see here that the U.S. economic
sanctions are not a relation problem between the U.S. and North Korea but
also a problem to both South and North Koreas. Moreover, such relation
between South and North Koreas will enforced the relational changes with
the surrounding four major countries (Order in the Northeast area of Asia)
around North Korea. Currently, the changes in the Japan’s political mea-
sures in supportive of the U.S. against North Korea (this includes the eco-
nomic blockade of North Korea by Japan) and the political measures of the
Korean Peninsula by Russia and China who are building their influence in
the affairs of South and North Koreas are inevitable. Therefore, the strength-
ening of the cooperation between South and North Koreas and the promot-
ing of pursuing changes will play an important role in the order of the flow-
ing Northeastern Asia.
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